Does Evolution Solve the Hold-up Problem by Tore Ellingsen & Jack Robles
Does Evolution Solve the Hold{up
Problem?
Tore Ellingsen¤ Jack Robles¤¤
First version: April 1 1999
This version: January 21, 2000
Abstract
The paper examines the theoretical foundations of the hold{up prob-
lem. At a ¯rst stage, one agent decides on the level of a relationship{
speci¯c investment. There is no contract, so at a second stage the agent
must bargain with a trading partner over the surplus that the invest-
ment has generated. We show that the conventional underinvestment
result hinges crucially both on the assumed bargaining game and on
the choice of equilibrium concept. In particular, we prove the following
two results. (i) If bargaining proceeds according to the Nash demand
game, any investment level is subgame perfect, but only e±cient out-
comes are evolutionarily stable. (ii) If bargaining proceeds according to
the ultimatum game (with the trading partner as proposer), only the
minimal investment level is subgame perfect, but any investment level
is evolutionarily stable.
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11 Introduction
Many investments are relationship{speci¯c. Leading examples include workers
who acquire a skill that is only valued by a particular employer and sellers who
develop a product which is only desired by a particular buyer. A vast recent
literature builds on the notion that the speci¯city of the investment makes
the investor vulnerable, and that this leads to underinvestment. An e±cient
level of relationship{speci¯c investments requires that the investor's return is
protected; contractually, through reputation, or through some other institu-
tional arrangement. While we appreciate the importance of this literature, the
purpose of the present paper is to examine critically the basic premise that
unregulated bargaining o®ers the investor insu±cient protection.
Suppose it is not possible to write any contract, neither on the investment
level itself nor on the terms of future transactions. Instead, the parties bargain
over the terms of trade after the investment cost has been sunk. The key idea,
which was articulated quite clearly already by Klein, Crawford and Alchian
(1978), is that sunk cost costs should not a®ect bargaining outcomes. Ex post,
agents bargain over the full bene¯t from trade, the \quasi{rent", rather than
over the bene¯t net of investment costs. If so, as shown by Grout (1984),
Grossman and Hart (1986), and Tirole (1986), there is necessarily underin-
vestment, because the investing party will not be able to appropriate the full
return to the (marginal) investment. This is the hold{up problem, or at least
the most popular version of it.1
While the irrelevance of sunk costs is an appealing principle for single
person decisions, where there is usually a unique ex post e±cient outcome, it
is a problematic principle for bargaining, where there is usually a large set of
ex post e±cient outcomes. Indeed, we shall argue that the investment cost
may be highly relevant for ex post bargaining, and that plausible theories of
bargaining may even admit e±cient investment. The existence of a hold{up
problem depends crucially both on the speci¯c bargaining procedure and on
the choice of solution concept.
To put the discussion in perspective, recall that both Grout (1984) and
Grossman and Hart (1986) assume that the bargaining outcome is determined
by the Nash bargaining solution, and that parties bargain over the gross sur-
plus. Thus, sunk costs are simply not allowed to matter in their framework.
There is a hold{up problem by construction. Tirole (1986) on the other hand
1As observed by HolmstrÄ om and Roberts (1999), the hold{up terminology has come
to cover a range of conceptually quite distinct ideas which have in common the notion
that relationship{speci¯c investments are vulnerable to ex post opportunism. For exam-
ple, Williamson (1975) is concerned primarily with complexity and bargaining breakdown
(coordination failure) rather than the irrelevance of sunk costs in bargaining.
2speci¯cally refers to non{cooperative bargaining games. However, the solution
concepts he employs all rely on backward induction. Thus, if the bargaining
game has a unique equilibrium which survives backward induction, there is no
way that sunk costs can a®ect the bargaining outcome. This is the natural
starting point of our paper, which asks the following two questions:
² What if the bargaining game has multiple subgame perfect equilibria?
² What if we employ other solution concepts than subgame perfection?
The bargaining game proposed by Nash (1953), known as the Nash demand
game, is a prominent example of a bargaining game with multiple equilibria.
Since this game only has one stage, all the equilibria are subgame perfect. If
investment is followed by the Nash demand game, is straightforward to show
that e±cient investment can be sustained in some subgame perfect equilib-
rium. Even more strikingly, if we re¯ne the set of equilibria using the concept
of stochastic stability, the only stable outcome is e±cient investment. The
allocation of surplus is also pinned down rather precisely, with the investor's
share decreasing in the coarseness of the investment decision. If investment
is binary, virtually all the surplus goes to the trading partner; as the grid of
possible investments gets very ¯ne, the investor appropriates virtually all the
surplus.
Multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria is in fact endemic in bargain-
ing games. Other examples include the contracting game proposed by Young
(1998) and alternating o®ers bargaining over a stream of services, as shown
by Haller and Holden (1990) and Fernandez and Glazer (1991). Remarkably,
van Damme, Selten and Winter (1990) demonstrate that even the celebrated
alternating o®ers model associated with Stº ahl (1972) and Rubinstein (1982)
has multiple subgame perfect equilibria under the realistic assumption that
the pie to be shared is not in¯nitely divisible.2 For example, it may not be
possible to divide money into smaller units than cents. Hence, the potential
to sustain e±cient investment in a subgame perfect equilibrium is not at all
limited to a small or peculiar class of bargaining games.
Moreover, even if a bargaining game has a unique subgame perfect equilib-
rium, it is not clear that we should neglect other Nash equilibria of the game.
Recent work in evolutionary game theory, notably NÄ oldeke and Samuelson
2Binmore et al. (1996) have argued that complexity costs may reestablish uniqueness of
equilibrium in this game, by favoring \simple" bargaining strategies which do not depend
on whether the player moves ¯rst or second at the start of the bargaining game. However,
this construction becomes rather arti¯cial once there is an additional asymmetry between
the players; in our model, it is important whether the player has made an investment at the
¯rst stage or not.
3(1993) and Binmore and Samuelson (1999), has made clear that evolution
may not always favor subgame perfect equilibria. Evidence from bargaining
experiments has also cast doubt on the predictive power of subgame perfec-
tion. To examine this issue, we also analyse a very simple bargaining game
with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, namely, an ultimatum game in
which the investor can only accept or reject the proposal made by the trading
partner. For believers in subgame perfection, this game provides the starkest
possible example of a hold{up problem: The investor should accept any o®er,
no matter how meager, hence the trading partner should demand (virtually)
the whole surplus, and consequently the investor should make (virtually) no
investment. While this outcome is stochastically stable, so is almost any other
outcome, including the e±cient investment level.
Although these are two speci¯c examples of bargaining games, the results
suggest that a general principle might be at work: When there is no ten-
sion between e±ciency and subgame perfection, stochastic stability not only
picks some e±cient outcome, but also selects a unique such outcome. On the
other hand, when e±ciency and subgame perfection are in con°ict, stochas-
tic stability has little cutting power. If this is indeed a general feature, the
two bargaining games we study represent opposite extremes, and evolutionary
analysis of the hold{up problem using other non{cooperative bargaining games
is bound to admit e±cient investment too.
While our analysis is evolutionary, the results can be given a rationalistic
interpretation using the concept of forward induction. The reason why the
investor is able to capture a share of the surplus that is su±cient to cover sunk
costs is that the trading partner believes that it will not pay to be more greedy.
After all, there are only two possible reasons why the investment was under-
taken. Either the investor expected coordination on a favorable equilibrium
or he made a mistake. The forward induction argument says that the trading
partner should try to square the observed action with rational behavior; hence
the trading partner should act in accordance with an equilibrium which makes
the observed level of investment ex post rational for the investor. In a com-
panion paper, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2000) presents a partial analysis of
this issue.3
Let us brie°y comment on some related literature. Young (1993b) is the
¯rst evolutionary analysis of a bargaining game. As most bargaining the-
ory, the paper considers bargaining over an exogenously given bargaining set.
Using the concept of stochastic stability, Young shows that the unique sta-
ble equilibrium of the Nash demand game is the Nash bargaining solution.
3Ellingsen and Johannesson also investigates other theoretical issues such as the roles of
social preferences and incomplete information. It also presents some experimental evidence.
4Subsequent evolutionary analysis of the Nash demand game, or closely related
games, include Skyrms (1996), Ellingsen (1997), Young (1998) and Saez{Marti
and Weibull (1999). The ¯rst evolutionary analysis of ultimatum bargaining is
Gale, Binmore and Samuelson (1995). They recognize that conventional evolu-
tionary analysis, of the kind employed in this paper, yields only the subgame
perfect outcome in the ultimatum game. However, considering a particular
form of drift in strategies, which gives higher probability to less costly mis-
takes, it becomes possible to sustain some Nash equilibria which give positive
payo® to the responder.4 In contrast to this literature, we endogenize the size
of the pie over which the parties bargain, and we ¯nd that it is illegitimate to
separate the analysis of the bargaining stage from the prior investment stage, as
has been common not only in the hold{up literature, but also in the bargaining
literature more generally. While the notion of an exogenously given bargaining
set has facilitated rigorous analysis, our ¯ndings imply that if agents a®ect the
bargaining set through prior actions, details about the prior actions need to
be an integral part of bargaining theory. The evolutionarily stable bargaining
outcome is a®ected not only by the cost and bene¯t associated with the actual
investment, but also by the cost and bene¯t of the best alternative investment.
Arguably, the paper most closely related to ours is NÄ oldeke and Samuelson
(1993), who developed the analysis of evolutionary stability in extensive form
games. One of their main applications is to outside option games, where the
¯rst stage is that one player selects whether to play a game with a second player
or not. When there is only one feasible investment level (except no investment),
our games are outside option games. Our result that there is investment in the
Nash demand game is then a corollary of NÄ oldeke and Samuelson's Proposition
8. We go quite a bit further, both by extending the analysis to arbitrary many
investment levels and by pinning down the precise sharing of surplus in a
stable equilibrium of a bargaining game. However, from the perpective of
game theory, our paper is primarily an application of the idea that evolution
favors forward induction to a greater extent than rationalistic arguments do.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the investment
options and the bargaining games. The section also provides a characteriza-
tion of the model's subgame perfect equilibria. In Section 3 we introduce the
evolutionary process and the stability criteria. Section 4 contains the main
results, and Section 5 concludes. An Appendix contains all the proofs.
4Binmore and Samuelson (1999) generalizes this idea considerably.
52 Investment and Bargaining
There are two players, A and B, who play a two{stage game. At stage 1,
player A chooses an investment I from a ¯nite set ª = f0=I0;I 1;:::;IN = ¹ Ig.
This investment creates a bene¯t (pie) of size V (I). At stage 2, the players
bargain. We will consider two di®erent bargaining games, namely, the Nash
demand game and the ultimatum game. In either case both players demand a
fraction of the pie. Let D(I)=f±;2±;:::;V (I) ¡ ±g denote the set of possible
demands that a player can make.5 Player A's demand is denoted y and player
B's demand is denoted x. For simplicity, we assume that V (I)=2 is divisible
by ±.
The pie, V (¢), is strictly increasing in investment. Let I¤ = argmaxfV (I)¡
IjI 2 ªg denote ¯rst{best investment, and let ^ I = argmaxfV (I)¡IjI 2 ªnI¤g
denote the investment level which generates the second highest total utility.
Both I¤ and ^ I are assumed to be unique.6
Bargaining according to the Nash demand game proceeds as follows. After
observing I, both players simultaneously make their demands y and x.I f
x+y · V (I) each player gets a share of the pie equal to his demand. Otherwise,
each player gets nothing. Taking investment costs into account, the payo® of
player A can thus be denoted
¼A =
½
y ¡ I; if x + y · V (I);
¡I; otherwise.
Player B's payo® is
¼B =
½
x; if x + y · V (I);
0; otherwise.
Observe that for player A, a pure strategy for the whole game is a pair (I;y) 2
ª £ D(I), whereas a pure strategy for player B is a function x :ª! D(I):
Alternatively, bargaining proceeds according to the rules of the ultimatum
game. In this case, player B makes an o®er x which player A observes and then
either accepts or rejects. If the o®er is accepted, player B gets x and player
A gets V (I) ¡ x: Otherwise, both players get nothing. Note that the payo®s
are the same as with the Nash demand game, but that A's set of demands
5Finiteness of the set D can be justi¯ed by the fact that there is often a smallest unit
of account, whereas ¯niteness of ª can be given the additional justi¯cation of technological
indivisibilities. Above all, ¯niteness of D and ª facilitates the evolutionary analysis, because
it allows the space of relevant strategies to be ¯nite.
6If there are two optimal investment levels, then choice between these two can work like
cheap talk, which would trivialize the analysis. It would make no di®erence if there were
two levels of investment which tied for second best.
6is smaller; it contains only the elements DA = fV (I) ¡ x;V (I)g, where the
¯rst element is equivalent to accepting B's o®er and the second element is
equivalent to rejecting it. However, the smaller set of demands for A is not
an important di®erence between the two games. It would not matter much
if we allowed player A to choose any demand in D; the essential distinction
between the two bargaining games is that B has a ¯rst{mover advantage in
the ultimatum game. For player A a pure strategy for the whole game is a
now pair (I;y(x)), i.e., A's demand is a function y : D ! D rather than a real
number.
Before turning to the evolutionary analysis, let us consider the subgame
perfect Nash equilibria. When the investment decision is followed by the Nash
demand game, there is a vast multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria. In par-
ticular, there are subgame perfect equilibria sustaining ¯rst{best investment.
To take one example, suppose A plays the strategy (I = I¤;y= V (I¤)¡±); and
B plays the strategy x(I)=± for all I. Clearly, B plays a best response to A's
strategy, since any higher demand than ± leads to a payo® of zero. To see that
A also plays a best response, notice that A by claiming V (I) ¡ ± is a residual
claimant to the surplus from investment. Thus ¯rst{best investment can be
implemented in a subgame perfect equilibrium without any contract whatso-
ever. This observation is in stark contrast to the conventional wisdom in the
hold{up literature, which is that investment will be distorted if the division of
surplus can not be committed to ex ante. That conclusion is inevitable in the
hold{up literature because it assumes that the bargaining game has a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium. In that case, players always get a ¯xed share of
the pie, and there tends to be underinvestment. Once there are many subgame
perfect equilibria, as above, the possibility emerges that the private marginal
return to investment can be the same as the marginal social return. On the
other hand, there are also equilibria with no investment. For example, it is an
equilibrium of the bargaining stage that B demands V (I) and A demands 0,
and this equilibrium in the subgame obviously sustains I =0 :
If the investment decision is followed by the ultimatum game, any subgame
perfect equilibrium outcome entails a low level of investment, I · ±. In this
case, player B knows that at the bargaining stage A will accept any proposal
which yields a positive share of the pie. Hence, player A gets at most ± from
the bargaining stage. Thus, it would be irrational for A to invest more than ±:
The above arguments extend straightforwardly, allowing a simple charac-
terization of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes for the two games.
Proposition 1 (i) If surplus is divided according to the Nash demand game,
any investment level I 2 ª can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium.
(ii) If surplus is divided according to the ultimatum game, only investment
levels I · ± can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium.
7Subgame perfection admits virtually any outcome in the Nash demand game,
but only admits low investment in the ultimatum game. As shown below, the
conclusion is radically di®erent when we apply the criterion of evolutionary
stability instead of subgame perfection.
3 Evolution
Evolutionary analysis refrains from answering the metaphysical question of
which strategies are rational. Instead, it tries to answer the more economic
question of which strategies can be expected to survive competitive pressures.
The study of stochastic evolution in games was pioneered by Foster and Young
(1990), Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993a). The extension
to extensive form games is due NÄ oldeke and Samuelson (1993), and we apply
their framework here.7
For each player role, A and B, let there be a population of size N. Each
period t 2f 1;2;:::g every possible combination of agents in populations A and
B meet and play the investment cum bargaining game. The set of strategies is
the same as above. Agents also hold beliefs about their opponent, but taking
an evolutionary approach, we do not require players to behave rationally given
their beliefs. Let º(¢jI) denote player A's beliefs concerning player B's demand,
and let ¾(¢jI) denote player, B's belief about player A's demand. Both º
and ¾ are probability distributions on the set of possible demands, and they
are contingent on the investment I. If surplus is divided according to the
ultimatum game, ¾ also depends on player B's demand, x.
We make two additional \technical" assumptions.
Assumption 1 (i) The pie division is small: V (^ I) > 2±. (ii) The population
is large: V (I¤)=N < ±.
The ¯rst assumption assures that the pie division is small enough that the
investor can actually get a positive net surplus with the second best investment.
The second assumption assures that the population is large enough (relative
to the minimum division) so that if one agent in the other population changes
his demand this will not change the best response demand.
A state µ speci¯es how many agents in each population have each possible
combination of belief and strategy. Observe that the set of possible states,
denoted £; is ¯nite. (Since the space of strategies and beliefs is di®erent for
7Our main results would be the same if we were to apply only normal form solution
concepts, but this would blur the comparison between evolution and subgame perfection.
8the two games, so is the state space.) With each state µ there is an associated
probability distribution of terminal nodes, denoted z(µ).
Beliefs and strategies evolve in two di®erent ways; by adaptation to the
current environment and by random mutation. Adaptation occurs in the fol-
lowing way. Every period each agent has an i.i.d. chance of rationally updating
his beliefs and strategy. This is called an updating draw. An updating agent
observes z(µ), updates his beliefs based on this observation (beliefs following
decision nodes not reached in state µ are unchanged) and chooses a best re-
sponse to his new beliefs. Updating works on behavioral strategies. If an agent
is already playing a best (behavioral) response following some node, then he
continues to do so, if not then he chooses one of the available best responses,
each with positive probability. Agents' beliefs and strategies are also changed
by 'mutation.' Every period each agent has an i.i.d. probability ² of mutating.
When an agent mutates his beliefs and strategy are chosen at random from
some exogenously given distribution which gives full support to all of that
agent's possible belief/strategy combinations. The updating draw and muta-
tions combine to form a markov chain over the state space £ in which every
transition has positive probability. Hence there exists an ergodic distribution
¹(²).
If a mutation changes an agents beliefs following a decision node that is not
currently reached, then this has no e®ect on the agent's payo®. The process
of moving the population's beliefs in this manner is called drift.
3.1 Solution concepts
We are now ready to introduce our main solution concepts, stochastic stability
and local stability. The set of stochastically stable states, denoted £¤, are
those assigned positive probability in the limit distribution ¹¤ = lim²!0 ¹(²).
Local stability is weaker than stochastic stability. A set of states is locally
stable if it takes more than one mutation to escape that set. An even weaker
solution concept is that of an absorbing set. A set Q is absorbing (w.r.t. the
updating draw) if the following two conditions hold: (i) from a state µ 2 Q
it is impossible to get to any state outside of Q without mutation, and (ii) if
µ and µ0 are both elements of Q, then it is possible for the population to get
from state µ to µ0 without mutation. Let ¹ Q be the set of absorbing sets. If an
absorbing set Q has only one element, µ; then we call µ an equilibrium. As it
turns out, all absorbing sets are equilibria in our model.
Proposition 2 Under either bargaining rule, if Q is an absorbing set, then Q
is a singleton.
9Proposition 2 allows us to speak about equilibria rather than absorbing sets
from now on. Let ¹ £ be the set of equilibria.
Before getting to the more substantial results, we need to be more precise
about our de¯nition of local stability. The basin of attraction of an equilibrium
µ, denoted B(µ), is the set of states µ0 such that the population can get from
µ0 to µ without mutation. Similarly, we say that µ0 is in the single mutation
neighborhood of µ, denoted µ0 2 M(µ), if µ0 and µ di®er by a single mutation. A
union of equilibria, X,i samutation connected set if for all pairs of equilibria
µ1,µn ½ X, there exists some ordering of the remaining equilibria, (µ2;:::;µn¡1),
such that for all k =1 ;:::;n; M(µk) \ B(µk+1) 6= ;. I.e., the set is mutation
connected if one can get from one equilibrium to another through a sequence
of single mutation transitions. A set of equilibria X is locally stable if: (i) X is
mutation connected, and (ii) from any µ 2 X, a single mutation (followed only
by adaptation) is not enough to exit from X. (Formally, the latter requirement
is that if µ 2 X and µ0 62 X, then M(µ) \ B(µ0)=;:)
As mentioned above, local stability is a necessary condition for stochastic
stability. Moreover, it can be shown that if one state in a locally stable set
is stochastically stable, then all states in that set are stochastically stable
(NÄ oldeke and Samuelson, 1993, Proposition 1). Let £L denote the union of all
locally stable sets.
Since the same equilibrium outcome (I;y;x) can often result from many
di®erent states (because beliefs may di®er), it is sometimes useful to speak
of the stability of outcomes rather than the stability of states. Likewise
we sometimes speak of transitions from one outcome to another as short-
hand for \transition from an equilibrium with one outcome to an equilib-
rium with another outcome." An outcome ½ is called locally stable if the set
fµjz(µ)puts probability 1 on ½g is a locally stable set. It will be shown below
that every locally stable set corresponds to a locally stable outcome, so that
there is no loss of generality in focussing on outcomes.
4 Main results
Our ¯rst result is a characterization of the locally stable outcomes when the
parties bargain according to the Nash demand game. As it turns out, only ¯rst{
best investment is locally stable. Any other investment level can be escaped
from by a simple series of single mutation transitions. To see this, suppose the
population has settled on an equilibrium involving a suboptimal investment
level I. Let population B drift to believe with certainty that were A to invest
I¤, then the associated demand would be V (I¤) ¡ ±: Then, if a member of
population A mutates to investing I¤ and claiming V (I¤) ¡ ±; this agent will
10do better than all other agents in population A. Hence, as other agents in
population A update their strategy, they will also start playing (I¤;V(I¤)¡±):
While all locally stable outcomes have investment I¤, there is some scope
for variation in the equilibrium division of surplus. We show that the largest
demand by agent B which is consistent with local stability is
x






¤ ¸ V (^ I) ¡ ^ I ¡ ±g:
To understand the magnitude of xL, observe that the largest demand that
agent B could make following an e±cient investment, that would not give
agent A an incentive (weakly) to choose a less e±cient investment, even if he
expected to get (almost) all of the surplus is
x
M = maxfx 2 DB(I
¤)jV (I
¤) ¡ x ¡ I
¤ >V(^ I) ¡ ± ¡ ^ Ig:




M + ±)(N ¡ 1)=N ¡ I
¤ = V (I
¤) ¡ x
M ¡ I













¸ V (^ I) ¡ ± ¡ ^ I;
where the strict inequality is due to Assumption 1. Intuitively, the (N ¡1)=N
term in xL assures that if one agent in population B changes his demand, this
will not cause agents in population A to change their investment away from
the e±cient level.
Proposition 3 Let agents bargain according to the Nash demand game. The
outcome ½ is locally stable if and only if ½ = f(I¤;V(I¤)¡x;x)g, where x · xL.
Note how, in this case, local stability identi¯es a much smaller set of out-
comes than did subgame perfection. In particular, subgame perfection allowed
ine±cient investment, whereas local stability does not.
Let us now re¯ne the set of locally stable outcomes and consider the
smaller set of stochastically stable outcomes. Although stochastic stability
is easy enough to de¯ne, the computation of stochastically stable equilibria
is a bit more demanding. It basically requires counting the number of muta-
tions needed to move from one equilibrium to another. The equilibria which
are most easily reached from all other equilibria (in terms of requiring fewest
mutations) are stochastically stable. To articulate this idea precisely, we need
11a couple of additional de¯nitions. Recall that ¹ £ denotes the set of equilibria.
Let r(µ;µ0) be the minimum number of mutations needed to move from an
equilibrium µ to another equilibrium, µ0: De¯ne the graph G as the collection
of vertices, one vertex for each equilibrium, with a directed edge from every
vertex to every other. The resistance (or cost) of the edge µ ! µ0 is r(µ;µ0).
A µ{tree, ¡, is a collection of edges in G such that from every vertex µ0 6= µ
there is a unique directed path to µ, and there are no cycles. The resistance
of a tree ¡ is the sum of the resistances of all the edges in the tree. Finally,
the stochastic potential of an equilibrium µ is the minimum resistance over all
µ-trees. The key to checking whether an equilibrium is stochastically stable is
provided by Young (1993a, Theorem 4).
Theorem 1 An equilibrium µ is stochastically stable if and only if no other
equilibrium has lower stochastic potential.
In fact, it is shown below (in the proof of Proposition 4) that it su±ces to con-
struct trees that are much simpler than those described above. By de¯nition,
any transition between equilibria requires at least one mutation. Hence, when
constructing a minimum resistance tree, one can ignore edges with resistance 1.
Notice also that from any equilibrium one may arrive at an equilibrium within
a locally stable set through a sequence of one mutation transitions, and one
may move around within the locally stable set in the same manner. Hence, it
su±ces to construct trees with locally stable sets (represented by locally stable
outcomes) as vertices.
Since all locally stable outcomes under Nash demand bargaining have the
property that I = I¤ and that y = V (I¤) ¡ x, these outcomes can be fully
characterized by B's demand, x. There are two ways in which a transition
between locally stable outcomes may occur. First, there might be a direct
transition, during which investment is maintained at the e±cient level. In
this case, we can appeal to Young (1993b) and observe that if x<x NBS =
V (I¤)=2; then the easiest transition is to the outcome x + ±: Conversely, if
x>x NBS; the easiest transition is to x ¡ ±: Denote the resistance to such a
transition by r(x): Second, there might be an indirect transition, during which
the population passes through a state with ine±cient investment. This involves
having a su±ciently large portion of population B increase their demands
to such an extent that e±cient investment is less attractive to population
A than the outcome (^ I;V(^ I) ¡ ±;±) (which is the most attractive ine±cient
outcome). If this happens|as it might do, following appropriate drift|then
the populations will make a transition to this ine±cient outcome, after which a
sequence of single mutation transitions (the resistances of which we can ignore)
su±ce to get the populations to (I¤;V(I¤)¡±;±): Let ^ r(x) denote the resistance
of the transition from the outcome (I¤;V(I¤) ¡ x;x)t o( ^ I;V(^ I) ¡ ±;±). Since
12we can show that ^ r(x) >r (x) whenever x>x L (see Appendix), it is easy to
construct a minimum resistance tree. The case xM >x NBS essentially reduces
to the analysis of the Nash demand game in Young (1993b). Otherwise, if
^ r(xL) ¸ r(xL ¡ ±); the minimum resistance tree is given by
± ¡! 2± ¡! ::: ¡! x
L ¡ ± ¡! x
L;
while if ^ r(xL) ¸ r(xL ¡ ±), the minimum resistance tree is given by
x
L ¡! ± ¡! 2± ¡! ::: ¡! x
L ¡ ±:
Both trees are constructed by including the minimum resistance transition out
of each locally stable outcome and then deleting the transition among these
which has the highest resistance.
Proposition 4 Let surplus be divided by the Nash demand game.
(i) If xNBS <x M; then the unique stochastically stable outcome is (I¤;V(I¤)¡
xNBS;x NBS).
(ii) If xNBS ¸ xM; then the set of stochastically stable outcomes is contained
within f(I¤;V(I¤) ¡ x;x)jx 2f xL ¡ ±;xLgg:
For a more precise statement of part (ii) of the proposition, see Lemma 10 in
the Appendix. From the point of view of the hold{up problem, part (i) is quite
uninteresting; the di®erence between e±cient and ine±cient investment is so
large that even the Nash bargaining solution would yield a su±cient investment
incentive.
Proposition 4 implies that if the set of possible investments represents a
su±ciently ¯ne grid, almost all the surplus goes to the investor, agent A.T o
see this, note that xM is the maximum demand such that it would not pay for
the investor to invest the second{best level, ^ I, even if he could keep virtually
all the surplus. Hence, if ^ I is close to I¤, the investor must get almost all the
surplus from I¤ as well.
If, on the other hand, the di®erence between ¯rst{best and second{best
investment is large, then a substantial fraction of the surplus may go to the
trading partner, agent B. In fact, if investment is binary, virually all the sur-
plus may go to agent B. For example, suppose investment is either 0 or 60,
and that V (0) = 0 and V (60) = 100: Then xNBS =5 0>x M =4 0 : Since
^ r(40) <r (40 ¡ ±), the unique stochastically stable equilibrium outcome is
(I¤;60 + ±;40 ¡ ±), leaving the investor with a minimal pro¯t. An interpre-
tation of this result is that it goes as close as possible to the ex post equal
split while respecting the forward induction property, identi¯ed by NÄ oldeke
and Samuelson (1993), that if there is any strict equilibrium consistent with
13investment, then there must be investment in any stable equilibrium.8
Suppose now that bargaining is conducted according to the rules of the
ultimatum game instead. Let IH be such that V (IH) ¡ IH ¡ xmax(IH) >
V (I) ¡ I ¡ xmax(I) for all I 6= IH. In other words, IH is the investment level
if agent A expects to be held up.
Proposition 5 Let surplus be divided according to the ultimatum game. An
equilibrium is stochastically stable if and only if agents in population A receive
at least V H ¡ IH ¡ xmax(IH).
Thus, stochastic stability has no cutting power when agents bargain according
to the ultimatum game. Although there is a unique subgame perfect equilib-
rium, with no investment, other equilibria are equally stable. In particular,
¯rst{best investment can be sustained in a stable equilibrium.
5 Final remarks
The idea that current bargaining outcomes are independent of sunk costs has
been applied widely both in economics and in other social sciences. In the
recent literature on the hold{up problem, Hackett (1994) is a lone dissenting
voice, pointing to sociological research and to his own experiments for evidence
that sunk costs matter. Hopefully, this paper has shown that game theory
admits a role for sunk costs as well.
An obvious limitation of our analysis is that we have considered two spe-
ci¯c bargaining games. A useful extension of the present paper would be to
replicate our analysis for other bargaining games. We conjecture that when
investment is followed by a relatively symmetric bargaining game, the results
will be quite similar to our results for the Nash demand game. As indicated in
the introduction, this might be true even for the alternating o®er bargaining
model of Rubinstein (1982).
Our analysis of the hold{up problem has focussed on the extreme case that
parties can write no ex ante contract whatsoever. But the paper's message
is also relevant when written contracts are subject to renegotiation. A vast
recent literature has considered incomplete contracts which partially or fully
solve the hold{up problem; see in particular Maskin and Tirole (1999) and
the references therein. One response to this literature has been given by Hart
8Interestingly, an experiment by Binmore et al. (1998) concerns what is essentially the
normal form of this game. Using a di®erent argument, they argue that the outcome which
gives all the surplus to the trading partner is natural if players are (close enough to) being
rational.
14and Moore (1999), who argue that the the hold{up problem tends to reappear
when parties cannot contract on the renegotiation procedure. Hart and Moore
instead assume that surplus from renegotiation is split with no regard to in-
vestment costs. The current paper suggests that this bargaining assumption
is questionable.
Appendix: Proofs
We start by proving Propositions 2 and 3. Let ½(Q) denote the set of outcomes
associated with the absorbing set Q.
The following two lemmas are needed in order to prove Proposition 2.
Lemma 1 Let z1 <z 2: : :<z k be demands in D(I) for some I 2 ª. Assume
that the set of demands following I for agents in the relevant population is
fzlgk
l=1. Then the set of best (behavioral) response demands following I for
agents in the other population is a subset of fV (I) ¡ zlgk
l=1.
Proof: Let Nl be the number of agents making demands of zl or less. The payo®
(ignoring the cost of investment ¡I for population A which is held constant) to
a demand of w with V (I)¡zl+1 <w<V(I)¡zl is wNl=N < Nl(V (I)¡zl)=N
which is the payo® for a demand of V (I) ¡ zl. The Payo® for a demand
w>V(I) ¡ z1 is 0 <N 1(V (I) ¡ z1)=N which is the payo® for a demand of
(V (I) ¡ z1). The payo® for a demand w<V(I) ¡ zk is w<V(I) ¡ zk which
is the payo® for a demand of V (I)¡zk. Hence any demand not in fV (I)¡zlg
can be improved upon by a demand which is in that set. 2
Lemma 2 If Q is an absorbing set with f(I;y;x);(I;y0;x 0)g2½(Q) and x 6=
x0 or y 6= y0, then Q is a singleton.
Proof: From Lemma 1 we know the set of demands following I must be fxlg
for population B and fyl = V (I)¡xlg for population A. Let Nl be the number
of agents making demand xl following I, and let Ml be the number of agents
investing I and then demanding yl. We assert that these numbers must be
constant in Q. Otherwise let a single agent i update and change Nl (resp.
Ml.) Let k 6= l, clearly it can not be the case that both yl and yk (resp.
xl and xk) are both best responses following I both before and after agent i
has updated. Start from this state in which one of these demands is not a
best (behavioral) response following I, and let all agents making that demand
update. That demand (call it zl) is now no longer made following I. Let all
agents in the other population update. They now have beliefs (by Lemma 1)
following I such that they will not make demand V (I) ¡ zl following I unless
they observe a demand of zl following I. However, in the next state in which
15investment I is made, let all agents in the ¯rst population update, they now
believe that demand V (I) ¡ zl is not made, and consequently will not make
demand zl. Hence these two demands have dissapeared and can not reappear,
which contradicts the assumption that Q is an absorbing set. Since Ml and Nl
can't decrease, (I;yl) is a best response and xl is a best (behavioral) response
following I. Since they can't increase every other strategy being played must
do as well, therefore the population is in equilibrium and Q is a singleton. 2
We are then ready to prove Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2: Assume that Q is not a singleton. Since updating does
not change o®{path beliefs, ½(Q) must be a nonsingleton. Consider µ 2 Q in
which investment I0 is made by some agent in population A. By Lemmas 1 and
2, we know that if Q is not a singleton, then 8(I;y;x) 2 ½(Q), x + y = V (I).
Let (I;y;x) 2 ½(Q) be such that if (I0;y0;x 0) 2 ½(Q), then y ¡ I ¸ y0 ¡ I0.I f
y ¡ I>y 0 ¡ I0, then agents playing (I0;y0) will update to (I;y) (or a strategy
which does equally well), but agents would never update to (I0;y0) as long as
someone is playing (I;y). Hence it must be the case that y ¡ I = y0 ¡ I0,o r
else Q was not an absorbing set. However, if y¡I = y0¡I0 8(I0;y0;x 0) 2 ½(Q);
then agents will update away from neither (I;y), nor (I0;y0). Thus, updating
alone can not change the state, and Q is a singleton. 2.
The next two lemmas are used in the proof of Proposition 3. The ¯rst
ensures uniqueness of equilibrium outcomes.
Lemma 3 Let µ be an equilibrium such that ½(µ) is not a singleton. Then 9µ0,
an equilibrium, such that ½(µ0) is a singleton and such that the population can
get from µ to µ0 through a sequence of one mutation transitions.
If in addition, every investment in µ is followed by a unique pair of demands,
and (I;y;x) 2 ½(µ), then µ0 can be chosen so that ½(µ0)=f(I;y;x)g.
Proof: Since µ is an equilibrium, it must be the case that all agents in popula-
tion A receive the same payo®. Consider ¯rst the case where multiple demands
are made following some investment I0. Let the demands made by population
B following I0 be x1 <: : :<x k, and let a single agent who demands xk follow-
ing I0 mutate to demand x1 following I0. In the following period let all agents
in population A update, they will all choose (I0;V(I0)¡x1) which is now their
unique best response. In the following period let all agents in population B
update, they all switch to a demand of x1 following I0. We are now at the
desired equilibrium.
Now assume a single demand is made following each investment level. Let
a single agent playing (I0;y0)( I0 6= I) mutate to (I;y). Since the distribution
of demands following any investment has not changed, no agent in population
16B has an incentive to change strategy. No new information has been revealed
(there were already agents playing (I;y),) and so no agent in population A
has an incentive to change his strategy. Therefore we are at a new equilibrium
with one more agent playing (I;y). By repeating this process we arrive at the
equilibrium µ0 in the Lemma. 2
Lemma 4 Let µ0 (½(µ0)=f(I0;y0;x 0)g) be an equilibrium. If I 6= I0 and
y ¡ I ¸ y0 ¡ I0, then the population can get from µ0 to an equilibrium µ with
½(µ)=f(I;y;x)g through a sequence of single mutation transitions.
Proof: In state µ0 let agents in population B drift to believe with certainty that
any agent in population A that invests I will demand y. This implies that for
all j in population B, xj(I)=x = V (I) ¡ y. Let a single agent in population
A mutate to play (I;y) (no change to beliefs.)9 In the next period let all
agents in A update, they all observe that xj(I)=x for all j in population B.
If y ¡ I>y 0 ¡ I0 then their best response is (I;y) to which they all switch,
leaving them at an equilibrium µ with ½(µ)=f(I;x;y)g.I fy¡I = y0¡I0 then
all agents in population A are playing a best response and we are at a new
equilibrium µ1 with ½(µ1)=f(I;y;x);(I0;y0;x 0)g. An application of Lemma 3
gets us to a state µ with ½(µ)=f(I;y;x)g. 2
Proof of Proposition 3: We need to demonstrate (i) that the population can get
from any equilibrium with an outcome not satisfying the Proposition's char-
acterization to an equilibrium with an outcome which does satisfy it, through
a sequence of single mutation transitions, and (ii) that the population can
not depart from an outcome satisfying the characterization without at least
two simultaneous mutations. Step (i): by Lemma 3 we may consider only µ
such that ½(µ) is a singleton. Let ½(µ)=f(I;V(I) ¡ x;x)g.I f I 6= I¤ then
V (I¤) ¡ ± ¡ I¤ >V (I) ¡ x ¡ I; so by Lemma 4 the population can get to
an equilibrium µL with ½(µL)=f(I¤;V¤ ¡ ±;±)g.I f I = I¤ but x>x L and
V (^ I) ¡ ± ¡ ^ I ¸ V (I) ¡ x ¡ I, then by Lemma 4 the population can get to an
equilibrium ^ µ with ½(^ µ)=f(^ I;V(^ I)¡±;±)g. Another application of Lemma 4
then gets the population to an equilibrium µL with ½(µL)=f(I¤;V¤ ¡ ±;±)g.
Finally, it might be that I = I¤, x>x L and V (^ I) ¡ ± ¡ ^ I<V (I) ¡ x ¡ I,
but V (^ I) ¡ ± ¡ ^ I>(V (I) ¡ x)(N ¡ 1)=N ¡ I. In this case, allow agents in
population B (resp. A) to drift to believe with certainty that population A
(resp. B) agents will demand V (^ I) ¡ ± (resp. ±) following an investment of ^ I.
If a single agent in population B mutates to demand x + ± following demand
of I¤, then population A payo®s will drop below what they correctly expect
9Note that since beliefs are not updated following mutation we might as simply say that
he believes that for all j in population B, xj(~ I)=V (~ I) ¡ ± if ~ I 6= I but xj(I)=x.
17to get following an investment of ^ I, which will lead them to play (following
updating) (^ I;V(^ I) ¡ ±). As above, an application of Lemma 4 completes the
proof.
Step (ii): Consider some µ with ½(µ)=f(I¤;y;x)g, and x · xL. We must
show that a single mutation can only move the population to a state µ1 with
½(µ1)=½(µ). Note ¯rst that for I 6= I¤, V (I) ¡ ± ¡ I · V (^ I) ¡ ± ¡ ^ I<
(V (I¤) ¡ xL)(N ¡ 1)=N ¡ I¤ · (V (I¤) ¡ x)(N ¡ 1)=N ¡ I¤. Hence, agents
in Population A will never choose an investment level other than I¤ as long
as they believe that at most one agent in population B is demanding more
than x following an investment of I¤. Hence, if an agent were to make an
investment other than I¤ because of a mutation, updating would not cause
other agents to imitate him, and he would therefore eventually update back
to (I¤;y). Now consider a mutation which leaves investment unchanged, but
changes demand following I¤ (this may be a mutation to an agent in either
population.) Since at least (N ¡ 1) agents in population B still demand x
following I¤, investment remains unchanged. For concreteness, let an agent
in population B change his demand to ~ x. Since x = V (I¤) ¡ y,i ti sab e s t
response, and so this di®erent demand does not give other agents in population
B reason to change their demand. By Lemma 1, either y or ~ y = V (I¤) ¡ ~ x
is the best response for agents in population A.I f ~ x>x , then demanding
y pays ((N ¡ 1)y +0 ) =N ¡ I¤, while demanding ~ y pays ~ y ¡ I¤. Agents in
population A will not change their demand if N¡1
N y ¸ ~ y. From the assumption
that V (I¤)=N < ±; we have y=N < ± which implies that N¡1
N y>y¡ ± ¸ ~ y.I f
~ x<xthen the payo® for demanding y is y¡I¤; while the payo® for demanding
~ y is ~ y=N ¡ I¤. Since y>V(^ I) ¡ ±>±>V(I¤)=N > ~ y=N, playing y is again
the best response for population A following this mutation. The case in which
an agent in population A mutates to a di®erent demand is symmetric, except
for the absence of the ¡I¤ term. Hence no single mutation causes any agent
other than the mutating agent to change his behavior, and the population
must return to an equilibrium µ0 with ½(µ0)=½(µ) as soon as the mutating
agent receives the updating draw. 2
From now on, write V ¤ and ^ V as shorthand for V (I¤) and V (^ I).
The following Lemmas are for ¯guring stochastic stability. Recall that we
have argued in the body above that it su±ces to construct trees with vertices
made up of locally stable outcomes. Hence, the ¯rst step|taken in Lemmas 5,
6 and 8|is to ¯nd, for each locally stable outcome, the easiest transition from
an equilibrium with that outcome to an equilibrium with another outcome. It
is shown that for (almost all) locally stable outcomes, the easiest transition is
one in which the investment level is not changed, and demands are changed
only minimally (by +=¡±). To show this, we must ¯rst ¯nd the least number
18of mutations for a transition from a locally stable outcome to an outcome with
ine±cient investment (for comparison). Now, clearly, an agent in population
A will only change his investment if he thinks that he is going to get some-
thing better, and the best outcome that he could expect with an ine±cient
investment is (^ I; ^ V ¡ ±;±): Hence, the question becomes: how many agents in
population B have to mutatte to a higher demand to make the above outcome
better than maintaining e±cient investment?
Recall that xL 2f xM;x M ¡ ±g:
Lemma 5 The number of mutations required to get from an equilibrium with
outcome (I¤;y;x) with x · xL to an equilibrium with outcome (^ I; ^ V ¡ ±;±) is
^ r(x) = minfrjr>N (1 ¡
^ V ¡±¡^ I+I¤
V ¤¡x )g.
Proof: To make agents change investment, r (the number of B agents who




¤ ¡ x) ¡ I
¤ < ^ V ¡ ^ I ¡ ±; (1)
since updating agents change their actions only when they are not already
playing a best response. Solving for r yields the desired expression. 2
Lemma 6
(i) If µ is an equilibrium with outcome (I¤;y;x), and x<minfxM;x NBSg;
the easiest transition away from ½(µ) is to an equilibrium with outcome (I¤;y¡
±;x + ±).
(ii) If xNBS <x<x M; then the easiest transition away from ½(µ) is to an
equilibrium with outcome (I¤;y+ ±;x ¡ ±).
(iii) If x = xM <x NBS then an easiest transition is to an equilibrium with
outcome (^ I; ^ V ¡ ±;±).
Proof: If x<x M then V ¤ ¡ x ¡ ± ¡ I¤ ¸ V ¤ ¡ xM ¡ I¤ > ^ V ¡ ± ¡ ^ I which
implies that V ¤ ¡ x ¡ ±>^ V ¡ ± ¡ ^ I + I¤. Hence
N(1 ¡
V ¤ ¡ x ¡ ±
V ¤ ¡ ±
) <N(1 ¡
^ V ¡ ± ¡ ^ I + I¤
V ¤ ¡ ±
): (2)
And so long as the population is su±ciently large, so too is the transition cost.
Now we know that if x<x NBS then it is easier to make a transition to
demands of x + ±; whereas if x>x NBS it is easier to make transitions to
x ¡ ±, which combined with the fact that transitions to x + ± are easier than
transitions to ine±cient investments completes the case where x<x M.
19From Proposition 3, we do not need to worry about x>x L, so all we need
to check is the case where x = xL = xM.I fxM <x NBS; then we know that
r(x) ¸ ^ r(x), because V ¤ ¡ xM ¡ ± · ^ V ¡ ± ¡ ^ I.2
If x = xM >x NBS then we can not say any more than that the easiest
transition is to an equilibrium with an outcome of either (^ I; ^ V ¡±;±)o r( I¤;y+
±;x¡±). We already knew this, but since either one of these transitions gets us
easily to another locally stable set, and allows an easy construction of a tree
around the Nash bargaining solution and e±cient investment, it really does
not matter.
Next, we turn to the analysis of stochastic stability. We ¯rst consider the
number of mutations required to make a transition directly from an equilibrium
with outcome (I¤;y;x), (y = V ¤ ¡ x) to one with outcome (I¤;y0;x 0). Along
this transition we will not allow the level of investment to change for any agent.
Hence results in this section are essentially borrowed from Young's bargaining
paper. Later we will worry about multi{step transitions in which one ¯rst
changes the investment and then changes the demand following the e±cient
investment.
Lemma 7 From an outcome (I¤;y;x) the easiest transition in which invest-
ment is at all times e±cient, but which ends with di®erent demands, is to an
outcome (I¤;y0;x 0) where x = x ¡ ±;x + ±;±; or V ¤ ¡ ±.
Proof: From Young (1993b) Lemma 1. 2
The idea is that if one population changes their demand, then the increase
in demand which will be least hard to get the other population to accept is
an increase of ±; while the decrease in demand that is easiest to get the other
population to accept is a decrease all the way to ±.
Lemma 8
(i) Moving from x to x ¡ ± takes N(1 ¡ x¡±
x ) mutations to pop A.
(ii) Moving from x to x + ± takes N(1 ¡ V ¤¡x¡±
V ¤¡x ) mutations to pop B.
(iii) Moving from x to ± takes N(V ¤¡x
V ¤¡±) mutations to pop B.
(iv) Moving from x to V ¤ ¡ ± takes N( x
V ¤¡±) mutations to pop A.
Proof: This again follows immediately from Young's Lemma 1. All that needs
be done is to note that both populations' 'sample size' is just N. 2
Lemma 9
(i) If ±<x<V¤ ¡ ±, then moving from x to x ¡ ± takes fewer mutations
than moving from x to ±, and moving from x to x + ± takes fewer mutations
than moving from x to V ¤ ¡ ±.
20(ii) If x = ± then moving from x to 2± takes the same number of mutations
as moving from x to V ¤ ¡ ±.
(iii) If x = V ¤ ¡ ± then moving from x to V ¤ ¡ 2± takes the same number
of mutations as moving from x to ±.
Proof: Note that
V ¤ ¡ x
V ¤ ¡ ±
=1¡
x ¡ ±





as V ¤ ¡ ±>(=)x. The other half is shown by replacing x with y. 2
A more exact statement of Proposition 4 is:
Lemma 10 Let surplus be divided by the Nash demand game.
(i) If xNBS <x M; then the unique stochastically stable outcome is (I¤;V(I¤)¡
xNBS;x NBS).
(ii) If xNBS ¸ xM and ^ r(xM) >r (xM ¡ ±); then the unique stochastically
stable outcome is (I¤;V(I¤) ¡ xM;x M):
(iii) If xNBS ¸ xM and ^ r(xM) <r (xM ¡ ±); then the unique stochastically
stable outcome is (I¤;V(I¤) ¡ xM + ±;xM ¡ ±):
(iv) If xNBS ¸ xM and ^ r(xM)=r(xM ¡ ±); then the stochastically stable
outcomes are (I¤;V(I¤) ¡ xM;x M) and (I¤;V(I¤) ¡ xM + ±;xM ¡ ±):
Proof: First assume that xL · xNBS. Construct ¡¤ as follows: For each
x 2 D(I¤) with x<x L, ¯nd µx;µ 0
x+± such that ½(µx)=f(I¤;V¤ ¡ x;x)g,
½(µx+±)=f(I¤;V¤¡x¡±;x+±)g and such that the cost of (µx;µ x+±)i sr(x) (this
is possible by Lemma 8.) Now ¯nd µxL; ^ µ such that ½(µxL)=f(I¤;V¤¡xL;x L)g,
½(µ)=f(^ I; ^ V ¡±;±)g and such that the cost of (µxL; ^ µ)i s^ r(xL) (this is possible
by Lemma 5.) Let ¡0 include each of the above (µx;µ x+±) (with x<x L)a s
well as (µxL; ^ µ). Let £1 include each µx (x · xL.) If ^ r(xL) >r (xL ¡ ±); then
let ¡1 =¡ 0 nf (µxL; ^ µ)g; and let µ¤ = µxL.I f ^ r(xL) <r (xL ¡ ±); then let
¡1 =¡ 0 nf (µxL¡±;µ L
x)g; and let µ¤ = µxL¡±. (In the case of equality, either
construction will work.) Since £1 contains an element from every locally stable
set, if £1 µ £i ½ ¹ £, then there exists µi+1 2 ¹ £ n £i and µ0 2 £i such that
r(µi+1;µ 0) = 1. Now let £i+1 =£ i [f µi+1g; and let ¡i+1 =¡ i [f (µi+1;µ 0g.
Since there is a ¯nite number of equilibria, there is some ¹ i such that £
¹ i = ¹ £,
at which point ¡¤ =¡
¹ i is a µ¤-tree. Note that for any µ-tree ¡, if ½(µ1) 6= ½(µ)
then 9µ0
1;µ 2 such that ½(µ1)=½(µ0
1) 6= ½(µ2) and such that (µ0
1;µ 2) 2 ¡. Now ¡¤
has the least costly transition of this kind for each outcome other than ½(µ¤),
and since r(x) <r (x + ±), we know that any transition out of ½(µ¤) is strictly
more costly than transition out of any other outcome. Thus, µ is stochastically
stable if and only if ½(µ)=½(µ¤) (unless r(xL¡±)=^ r(xL) in which case either
construction yields a lowest cost tree.)
21The proof when xL >x NBS proceeds exactly as above, except that in
the construction of £1 and ¡1, for x<x NBS one needs (µx;µ 0
x+±) and for
xNBS <x· xL one needs (µx;µ 0
x¡±). Note that r(x) <r (x + ±)i fx<x NBS
and r(x) >r (x + ±)i fx>x NBS. 2
Finally, let us consider ultimatum bargaining. Some of the above lemmas
for the Nash demand game carry through with minor modi¯cations: Lemma
1 applies, except that there can clearly only be one set of demands following
any investment. Obviously in an equilibrium, agents in population A accept
all demands made in that equilibrium, so that if two agents in B were mak-
ing di®erent demands, then they would have di®erent payo®s following that
investment level, and one of them would imitate the other following updating.
Lemma 2 applies unchanged. Lemma 3 applies, but with the same caveat as
in Lemma 1. Lemma 4 applies, but the proof must be changed so that agents
in population B drift to believe that following an investment of I agents in
population A will reject any demand greater than y. Next, we need some
additional results.
Lemma 11 Let surplus be divided by the ultimatum game. The component
with the subgame perfect outcome, (IH;VH ¡ xmax(IH);x max(IH)), is a subset
of the unique locally stable set.
Proof: This is established by showing 9µH such that µH 2 T(µ) for all equilibria
µ and such that ½(µH)=f(IH;VH¡xmax(IH);x max(IH))g. To do this, consider
an equilibrium µ which, by Lemma 3, we may assume to have single outcome,
½(µ)=f(I;V(I) ¡ x;x)g. Let population A drift to expect a demand of
xmax(I0) following any investment I0 6= I, and to accept a demand of xmax(I)
following I. Let a single agent in population B mutate to demand xmax(I).
His demand will be accepted, and so if the rest of B update, then they will
imitate him. At this point agents in A expect a maximal demand to follow
all investments which makes (IH;accept) their best choice. Hence when they
update they will shift to this strategy, and we arrive at the desired outcome.
2
Lemma 12 Let surplus be divided by the ultimatum game. Agents in popula-
tion A receive a payo® of at least V H ¡ IH ¡ xmax(IH) in every equilibrium.
Proof: This is the worst payo® that an agent could expect for investing IH.
Hence if an agent in A were recieving less than this, he would change his
investment to IH. 2
Lemma 13 Let surplus be divided by the 'ultimatum' game. If V (I)¡I ¡x ¸
V H ¡ IH ¡ xmax(IH); then there exists an equilibrium µ such that µ 2 £L and
½(µ)=( I;V(I) ¡ x;x).
22Proof: Immediate from Lemmas 11 and 4. 2
Note that of course if two outcomes give the same payo® to A, higher than
that given by the hold{up equilibrium, then there are equilibria in which both
outcomes are present. The above lemma is more a statement about the richness
out equilibria, not a restriction. The latter is the job of the previous lemma.
Proof of Proposition 5: From Lemmas 11, 12 and 13 we know that this is the
unique locally stable set, which Samuelson (1994) has shown must equal the
stochastically stable set. 2
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